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SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF LAND CONTRACTS
IN NORTH DAKOTA
THEoN W. ATwooD*
VIEW of the broad provisions of the Revised Code of North
Dakota which have abolished deficiency judgments in proceedings for the foreclosure of real estate mortgages and land contracts
and in other actions, the question has arisen whether those provisions have not also abrogated the jurisdiction of the court to grant
specific performance of a land contract against the vendee at the
suit of the vendor. There is apparently no such general belief but
the question has been raised sufficiently to merit a brief discussion
of the matter.
The significance of this question becomes apparent when we consider another provision of the Code, § 32-0408, which is generally
recognized as having established the doctrine of mutuality of remedy in this state. It would of course follow that if the law of this
state does not permit a land contract to be specifically enforced
against the vendee, the remedy of specific performance against the
vendor is likewise not available to the vendee. In other words, the
courts would be without jurisdiction to decree specific performance
of such contracts in favor of either the vendor or the vendee.
One of the sections of the Code which we have under consideration is § 32-1906. It prescribes what the judgment shall contain in
an action for the foreclosure of a real estate mortgage or the cancellation or the foreclosure of a land contract, and further provides:
"The court under no circumstances shall have power to render
a deficiency judgment for any sum whatever against the mortgagor or purchaser or the successor in interest of either."
X

The following section, § 32-1907, provides:
"Neither before nor after the rendition of a judgment for the
foreclosure of a real estate mortgage or for the cancellation or
foreclosure of a land contract made after July 1, 1937, shall
the mortgagee or vendor, or the successor in interest of either,
be authorized or permitted to bring any action in any court in
this state for the recovery of any part of the debt secured by
the mortgage or contract so foreclosed. It is the intent of
this section that no deficiency judgment shall be rendered
upon any note, mortgage, or contract given since July 1, 1937,
to secure the payment of money loaned upon real estate or to
secure the purchase price of real estate, and in case of default
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the holder of a real estate mortgage or land contract shall be
entitled only to a foreclosure of the mortgage or the cancelation or foreclosure of the contract."
It has been contended that the language employed in the section last quoted is sufficiently broad to prohibit the bringing of an
action to specifically enforce a land contract against the vendee,
and in support of that contention we are particularly referred to
the last part which reads:
".. . and in case of default the holder of a real estate mortgage

or land contract shall be entitled only to a foreclosure of the
mortgage or the cancellation or foreclosure of the contract."
It may be possible that that and other language found in the
section when considered apart from the context could be construed
to substantiate such a proposition, but when viewed in connection
with the rest of the section a construction of that nature is hardly
tenable. The intent of the section is clearly and unequivocally
stated, that is, to prevent the rendition of any deficiency judgment
in the cases and under the conditions specified. It would seem impossible to discover therein an intent to prohibit specific performance of a land contract against the vendee.
A consideration of the history of legislation is often helpful in
reaching a proper construction of a statute. Prior to 1933 we find
that mortgage foreclosure proceedings in this state were similar to
those in many other jurisdictions. As was said in Burrows v. Paulson,
64 N. D. 557, 561, 254 N.W. 471, 474 (1934):
"..

. Originally a proceeding to foreclose a mortgage was

strictly in rem. No personal judgment could be rendered therein for the deficiency."
After stating the reason therefor the court said further, however,
that a change had been generally made by statute or rule of court
permitting a personal judgment for a deficiency in a foreclosure
action against the mortgagor.
N. D. Comp. Laws § 8100 (1913), in addition to authorizing the
court to render judgment against the mortgagor for the amount
of the mortgage debt then due and to decree a sale of the mortgaged premises, also provided that "the court may direct the issuing of
an execution for the balance that may remain unsatisfied after applying the proceeds of such sale."
In Bull v. Smith, 45 N. D. 613, 178 N. W. 426 (1919), and again
in Bull v. Smith, 49 N. D. 337, 191 N. W. 624 (1922), the right of
a mortgagee to a personal judgment against the mortgagor for the
entire amount due was recognized, and the court said in the latter

SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF LAND CONTRACTS IN N. D.

391

case that the practice was to apply the proceeds of the sale of the
premises in satisfaction of the judgment, and that the original
judgment then stood as a deficiency judgment for the balance of
the debt remaining unsatisfied.
N. D. Comp. Laws § 8100 (1913) was amended by N. D. Laws
1933, c. 155, by deleting therefrom the provision quoted above
which authorized the court to direct the issuance of an execution
for the balance of the judgment remaining unsatisfied after sale of
the mortgaged premises. The 1933 amendment also added, among
other things, the following provisions:
"... and the court shall have no power to render a deficiency
judgment. Nothing herein shall be construed to postpone or
affect any remedy the creditor may have against the party personally liable for the mortgage debt other than the mortgagors
and their grantees."
The apparent purpose of the act was of course to prohibit the
rendition of a deficiency judgment against a mortgagor or his
grantee in mortgage foreclosure proceedings. In Burrows v. Paulson
supra, it was held that the effect of c. 155, N. D. Laws 1933, was
to deprive the court of the power "to enter a deficiency judgment
as an incident to a foreclosure,", but that where there are two contracts, such as a note and a mortgage contract, as there usually are,
the effect of the act was "to relegate a mortgagee foreclosing to an
action at, law to recover any deficiency remaining after a sale of the
mortgaged property and the application of the proceeds on the
mortgage debt." The court further explained: "For, though the distinction between actions at law and suits in equity has been abolished ..... this is a change in form rather than of substance and
the distinction between legal and equitable rights and remedies
remains." In other words, the case decided that the amendment
did not prohibit the mortgagee from obtaining a deficiency judgment in another action. In the Burrows case the court referred
to other sections of the Compiled Laws of 1913 governing foreclosure proceedings which were not affected by the 1933 amendment and which, it was pointed out, permitted a mortgagee to sue
first at law on the indebtedness and subsequently to foreclose the
security if the judgment obtained in the first action was not satisfied. The court then reasons: "We cannot believe the legislature
intended to penalize him for reversing this procedure so if he foreclose his mortgage first and a deficiency results he cannot proceed
at law to collect by suit, judgment, and execution, and must suffer
the loss."
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Such was the law as to deficiency judgments until enactment of
N. D. Laws c. 159, 1937, which was not simply an amendment of
§ 8100, but was, as stated in the title:
"An Act relating to the foreclosure of real estate mortgages and
land contracts, providing what the judgment and decree shall
contain, and prohibit any deficiency judgments."
Section 1 of the act is substantially the same as Section 8100,
N. D. Laws 1913, as amended, except that it includes land contracts
and the provision prohibiting deficiency judgments is stated somewhat more emphatically as follows:
".. . and the Court shall under no circumstances have power
to render a deficiency judgment for any sum whatever."
Sections 2 and 3 were new, and they read as follows:
§ 3. Other Suits Prohibited. That neither before nor after the
rendition of the judgment and decree herein provided for, shall
the mortgagor or contract holder, or their successors in interest, be authorized or permitted to bring any action in any Court
in this State for the recovery of any part of the debt secured by
said mortgage or contract so foreclosed.
"§ 3. Intent. Interpretation. It is the intent of the legislature
to provide by this Act that hereafter there shall be no deficiency judgments rendered upon notes, mortgages, or contracts
given to secure the payment of money loaned upon real estate
or given to secure the purchase price of real estate, and in case
of default the holder of a real estate mortgage or land contract
shall only be entitled to a foreclosure or a cancellation of the
mortgage or contract and no Court shall place any other construction upon this Act."
Section 4 contained a saving clause and Section. 5 repealed all
acts or parts of acts in conflict therewith.
It would seem quite apparent that the enactment of the 1937
statute was prompted by the decision in Burrows v. Paulson, supra,
that the 1933 act did not prohibit the rendition of all deficiency
judgments. It is not at all unlikely that the later act was passed to
effectuate the result which might have been intended by the 1933
statute but which was not thereby attained. In any event the language employed in the 1937 act leaves no doubt as to the intention
of the legislature in enacting that statute. Both in the title of the
act and in Section 3 the intention is clearly expressed, which is to
prohibit any and all deficiency judgments.
On the other hand, neither in the history of this legislation nor
in the act itself is there found any evidence of an intention on the
part of the legislature to take from the vendor in a land contract
the right to enforce it specifically against the vendee. The provisions
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of N. D. Laws 1937, c. 159, were substantially reenacted by N. D.
Rev. Code §§ 32-1906 and 32-1907 (1943). We find some changes
in those sections but nothing to indicate any intention to broaden
the scope or effect of the 1937 act.
There is an even more persuasive reason for the conclusion that
the provisions in question do not bar the remedy of specific performance against the vendee. N. D. Const. § 61 provides that "No
bill shall embrace more than one subject, which shall be expressed
in its title, but a bill which violates this provision shall be invalidated thereby only as to so much thereof as shall not be so expressed."
A similar provision is found in practically all the constitutions of
the several states. The phraseology is sometimes different; instead
of the word "bill", as used in the North Dakota constitution, we
find the words "law", "statute", or "act." Likewise, in other constitutions the word "object" is used rather than "subject." In general,
the words "law", "statute", "act", and "bill" as used in such constitutional provisions, have been held to be synonymous. "Object"
and "subject" have likewise been given the same meaning. 1 SUrTHRLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 284-285 (3d ed. 1943).
It should probably be stated here parenthetically, as held in Daly
v. Beery, 45 N. D. 287, i78 N. W. 104 (1920) that Section 61 applies
only to acts passed by the legislature and that it "has no reference
to the initiative and referendum."
The manifest purpose of this constitutional provision is to prevent surprise, or fraud, in the legislature by means of provisions in
bills of which the titles give no intimation. CRAWFORD, STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION 134 (1940). It has been generally held, however,
that this requirement should be liberally construed to sustain the
validity of both the title and the act. In passing on the provision,
the Supreme Court of this state said in State v. Burr, 16 N.D. 581,
587, 113 N.W. 705, 708 (1907)
"The title should be liberally, and not technically, construed.
The construction should be reasonable. Conflict with the constitutional provision must appear clear and palpable, and, in
case of doubt as to whether the subject is expressed in the title,
the law will be upheld... If the subjects in the law are germane
or reasonably connected with the subject expressed in the title,
the constitutional requirement is sufficiently met. The provision
is mandatory on the courts and on the legislature."
Referring again to the title of Chapter 159, N.D. Laws 1937, the
subject to the bill as therein stated is foreclosure of real estate
mortgages and land contracts, indicating also the inclusion of pro-
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visions in the bill as to what the judgment and decree shall contain
and to prohibit any deficiency judgment. The words "specific performance" do not appear in the title, nor is there expressed therein
anything which indicates a provision in the body of the act dealing
with the matter of specific performance of land contracts or any
remedy of the parties thereto other than foreclosure or actions to
obtain a deficiency judgment. Nor can it be asserted that a provision prohibiting specific performance of a land contract against
the vendee is-"germane or reasonably connected with the subject
expressed in the title," which in this case is foreclosure of real estate mortgages and land contracts. Foreclosure of a land contract
and a suit for specific performance thereof are distinctly different
remedies. One is not auxiliary to the other, nor can it be said that
it is necessary to prohibit specific performance against the vendee
in order to effectuate the expressed object of the act. To construe
the act as embodying such a further prohibition would require a
holding that the act embraces a subject not expressed in the title.
Under Section 61 of the constitution such objectionable portion of
the act would be invalid.
We accordingly conclude that the broader meaning and effect
sometimes attributed to Chapter 159 N.D. Laws 1937, and the
corresponding provisions of the Revised Code cannot be sustained.
Very few cases involving specific performance of a land contract
against the vendee have come before the Supreme Court of this
state for decision. At least one such case, Funk v. Baird, 70 N.D.
396, 295 N.W.87, decided in 1940, came after the enactment of
the 1937 statute. The question here under discussion was not
raised in that case. Whether it was because of a generally accepted
opinion that the act had no effect upon the vendor's right to specific
performance, or whether it was because the contract was entered
into prior to the effective date of the act, is merely a matter of
conjecture.
Having concluded that the scope of the provisions in question extends only to prohibiting all deficiency judgments both in foreclosure proceedings and in separate suits, it follows that the remedy
of specific performance is still available to the vendor. Lack of
mutuality of remedy because of those particular provisions of the
Code cannot therefore be asserted, and the remedy of specific
performance is accordingly likewise available to the vendee.
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